The political economy of Brexit: why making it easier to leave the club could improve the EU by Bongardt, Annette & Torres, Francisco
  
Annette Bongardt and Francisco Torres 
The political economy of Brexit: why 
making it easier to leave the club could 
improve the EU 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Bongardt, Annette and Torres, Francisco (2016) The political economy of Brexit: why making it 
easier to leave the club could improve the EU. Intereconomics, 51 (4). pp. 214-219. ISSN 0020-
5346 
 
DOI: 10.1007/s10272-016-0605-z 
 
© 2016 ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67483/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
	 1	
 
The Political Economy of Brexit: Why making it easier to leave the club 
can allow for a better functioning EU1 
by 
Annette Bongardt2 and Francisco Torres3 
 
 
 
Abstract: The UK exit from the EU represents a qualitative change in the nature of EU 
membership. On the one hand, membership needs to entail constant caretaking as far as 
individual members’ contributions to the common good are concerned, with both rights and 
obligations. Countries with preferences that are too divergent for the Union to function properly 
should then not be discouraged to invoke Article 50 and to opt instead for membership in the 
EEA or for a free trade agreement. The Union has to deliver to be sustainable, but it cannot do so 
if there is a constant hold up of decisions that are in the common interest. On the other hand, 
with the Eurozone having established itself as the de facto core of European (political) 
integration, the UK’s preference for a stand-alone (and incomplete) economic union became 
untenable, because the need to make the monetary union work calls for further integration and 
institution building in the economic union sphere. 
 
 
 
1. The Choice for Brexit 
 
As the 23rd of June UK referendum on EU membership was approaching a majority for a British 
exit from the EU (Brexit) seemed an increasingly likely possibility, yet the outcome appears to 
have taken almost everyone by surprise. The leave camp won with a rather good turnout (above 
70%, which is significantly higher than the turnout for the United Kingdom’s EC referendum 
back in 1975 or the British Parliamentary elections in 2015). 
 
Hardly a surprise 
Looking back at the discussions during the campaign, it is probably fair to say that arguments 
seemed to carry little weight. As far as the unsuccessful ‘remain side’ is concerned, the issue was 
probably less one of a ‘project fear’ on the part of some but rather that on the whole the ‘remain 
camp’ was campaigning not on a positive message but on a negative one. It defended the option 
to stay in the EU on the alleged merits of a diluted, non-functioning EU/EMU project, and 
conditional upon many exceptions. Even some academics did just that in public debates. Not to 
mention the (by now former) Prime Minister and part of the conservative party who – having 
raged against EU membership for years, sometimes very much along the lines of 																																																								
1 Pre-print version of Bongardt and Torres (2016), Intereconomics - Review of European Economic Policy, Vol. 51, 
No. 4, ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Springer. 
2 European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, National Institute for Public 
Administration, UFP, Porto, and CICP (FCT).  
3 European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, PEFM, St. Antony’s College, Oxford 
University, Universidade Católica, Lisbon, and CICP (FCT).  
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UKIP, threatening the rest of the club with exit – had made a sudden turnaround (thereby not 
exactly enhancing the credibility of remain), pointing to the perils and costs associated with a 
Brexit. It should then have come hardly as a surprise that the remain camp’s Eurosceptic-led 
campaign did not work: people tend to prefer going for the original instead of the copy, in this 
case, for ‘leave’ rather than for ‘remain’ with reservations in a very watered-down EU.4  
 
No panic, just different UK preferences 
We do not see the magnitude of shock from UK exit to the EU that others5 seem to perceive. 
Markets did not panic (but are obviously adjusting to new realities, as illustrated by movements 
in the external value of the British pound or UK asset prices) nor did the EU population and 
polity. After all, the UK was already not participating in many EU policy areas and common 
goods.  
 
On the other hand, the scope of exemptions granted to the UK and the country’s strong 
opposition to EU integration have been undermining the good functioning of the EU. Those 
exemptions – cherry picking in the club benefits – were set to increase further: Had the option to 
remain in the EU won the referendum, the pre-referendum settlement with the UK, an 
intergovernmental agreement which enshrined additional exemptions, would have to be enacted.6 
At the same time, opposition to EU integration would have probably also risen.7 For instance, the 
Eurozone, which is the core of the EU, would have risked seeing its legitimate efforts to 
strengthen EMU, including where necessary by deepening the single market, to be vetoed by the 
UK.8 Quite possibly then the EU project was not sustainable with the UK inside.  
 
In the future Anglo-Saxon and more continental European perspectives will probably tend to 
diverge ever more on issues such as financial regulation, CETA, TTIP, among others, for there 
has been mounting disagreement. Most EU countries favour a model of society more in line with 
social Europe. The UK’s manifested preferences in regard to product and labour market 
																																																								
4 This is also the case in many other EU countries, where governments seem not to govern on the basis of their 
convictions but appear to shadow populist anti-EU parties on the right and on the left. The more they do so the more 
they risk losing votes to the originals that they imitate.  
5 See for instance George Soros in his statement submitted to the European Parliament on 30 June 2016. 
6 Prime Minister Cameron’s unilateral demands for a ‘new settlement for the UK in a reformed European Union’ 
regarded the single market and UK sovereignty. Presented under four headings, they regarded completing the single 
market with regard to the free movement of goods, services and capital; imposing limits to social benefits with the 
aim to reduce the free movement of persons to the UK; guarantees as to the integrity of the single market in the face 
of Euro-area measures; and an end to the treaty commitment towards an ‘ever closer union’. The wish list is by itself 
untimely and of a poor exercise in democracy. The correct forum for member states to ask for changes to the treaties 
and for proposing EU reform is at the time of treaty revisions where all member states can present their positions 
and negotiate, and where treaty revisions are then democratically ratified. This proceeding stands in stark contrast 
with the inter-governmental agreement struck among heads of EU state and government, who conceded exemptions 
to the UK, which affected other EU citizens and the EU’s credibility.  
7 According to Paul De Grauwe, the Brexit camp would be working from within to undermine the union. See P. De 
Grauwe: http://blog.oup.com/2016/05/eu-benefit-from-brexit/. 
8 A. Sapir, G. Wolff: One Market, Two Monies: The European Union and the United Kingdom, Bruegel Policy 
Brief, 2016/01. See also A. Bongardt: Growth: The Possibility of a Truly Single Market, In: The Future of Britain in 
Europe, 2016, London: IPPR. 
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regulation tend to be closer to the US or Canada.9 The above upcoming issues will test whether 
the UK’s preferences are more in line with the US and Canada than with the rest of Europe. If 
so, it would constitute one more argument playing in favour of the UK’s decision to leave the 
EU: the divide that already seemed insurmountable – it motivated the referendum on EU 
membership after all – was bound to increase even further given that those issues will soon have 
to be tackled in the EU. The EU’s capacity to shape globalization in line with citizens’ concerns 
(not merely growth-oriented but in a more inclusive and greener manner) will be critical for the 
support of the project. 
 
Not such a big divide on the EU within the UK electorate as claimed 
Contrary to what is often alleged, and considering that also many in the remain camp do not like 
the EU and its political project, one can argue that in essence there is not that great a divide on 
the EU within the British electorate.10 Of course, the UK has repeatedly signed up to the EU 
project, hereby including the political objective of an ever-closer union of peoples, at the time of 
accession and at each subsequent treaty revision. However, at the time of joining in 1973 – and 
one may add ever since – stress was put on economic advantages and not on political 
commitments, akin to the UK merely joining and operating in an enlarged free trade zone.11 Yet, 
the realization of the benefits from deeper economic integration as is the case of the single 
European market requires sovereignty sharing.12 Of course, sharing sovereignty in turn also 
presupposes (a certain degree of) convergence of preferences.13 It is easier among more similar 
countries. 
 
In a way, the leave camp (which won the referendum by a margin of almost 4 per cent or roughly 
1.2 million votes) played it more straightforward whereas remain-camp eurosceptics, which in 
fact led the campaign of the remain camp, would like to stay but only in a very different EU. 
This is however not what most other EU members want. There is little doubt that most UK 
citizens seem not to support some of the most important European public goods and that the 
same applies to the European integration project. The UK government demanded additional 
exceptions in February of this year, one of which most notably on one of the EU’s four 
fundamental freedoms, the free movement of persons, in order to support UK membership in the 
referendum. The remain camp campaigned for UK membership with those new concessions, 
which came in addition to continued non-participation in EMU, in the Schengen agreement and 
in various other EU common goods. In that sense, there was little point (as well to be made) for 																																																								
9 OECD: Economic Policy Reforms 2015. Going for Growth, Paris 2015, OECD. 
10 For a poll taken on the day of the referendum see M. Ashcroft: “How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday… 
and why”, 24 June 2016.  
11 According to N. Davies: Not forever England: A European History of Britain, In: Europe East and West, 2007, 
London: Pimlico, pp. 83-105, the UK’s attitude towards Europe has not only been driven by government and party 
policies but can be attributed to more fundamental misconceptions about its history, Anglo-centric and diminishing 
the many interactions with Europe. The UK’s first in-out referendum (on EC membership in 1975) already showed a 
divide also within the two main parties. 
12 L. Tsoukalis: The New European Economy Revisited, 3rd edition, Oxford 1997, Oxford University Press. 
13 A. Bongardt; F. Torres: Forging sustainable growth: the issue of convergence of preferences and institutions, In: 
Intereconomics, Forum – Convergence in the Eurozone, 2013, Springer Verlag, 48, 2. See also A. Bongardt, op. cit.; 
I. Begg, A. Bongardt, K. Nicolaïdis, F. Torres: EMU and Sustainable Integration, In: Journal of European 
Integration, 37, 7, 2015; and E. Jones, F. Torres: An 'Economics' Window on an Interdisciplinary Crisis, In: Journal 
of European Integration, 37, 7 (Nov.), 713-722. 
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the UK in staying in the EU. And possibly even those demonstrating against Brexit in the streets 
of London in the aftermath of the referendum (some of whom woke up late to the costs 
associated with not caring much about the EU, alias similarly to many others across Europe) 
would again be more on the ‘Leave’ side as far as contributing to European public goods and 
participating in the political integration project is concerned.14 This continued unhappiness of the 
UK with its EU membership is in our opinion based on a misunderstanding of the essence and 
objectives – above all, political – of the EU club and the European integration project.15 
 
Club benefits	
The UK was torn right from the outset between the economic benefits that come with 
membership of a more deeply integrated club, and the perceived political costs in terms of 
sovereignty sharing or loss.16 The fact that it did join in 1973 testifies to the fact that the prospect 
of higher economic advantages – brought about by large market scale and the customs union – 
prevailed over its reservations about the supranational EC integration model and the political aim 
of an ‘ever closer union’, which was (and still is) part and parcel of it. 
 
Over time, the UK has opted to limit its participation in European common goods: it does not 
participate in the Schengen agreement and in police and justice matters, it secured a protocol to 
the treaty relating to the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and it has an opt-out 
from EMU. For the UK the benefits to be had from the EU are hence narrowed down very much 
to the (incomplete) economic union sphere and more precisely to the single market whereas 
other member states can take a more encompassing and compensatory view across wider issue 
areas.17 The UK justified its renegotiation attempt with the objective to make the single market 
work better for it (higher benefits) and with the allegedly high (sovereignty) costs of 
membership. Yet, in-depth reports carried out by the UK government did not yield any need for 
repatriation of competences and concluded that proposals for advanced improvement could be 
																																																								
14 See S. Hix: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/government/2016/06/30/hotseat-simon-hix-on-the-eu-referendum-result-the-
implications-of-brexit/, argues that even if those people who may belatedly have second thoughts could vote again 
that would not really change the outcome. 
15 According to M. Emerson: Brexit – a last testament, CEPS Commentary, 23 May 2016, the first factor for strong 
British support for Brexit was “a decided political and cultural preference from the very start in the 1950s for free 
trade over greater political integration”. 
16 The UK left the Spaak committee in 1955 in disagreement with the supranational model of integration and took 
the decision not to join what was to become the European Economic Community (EEC). It then promoted the 
creation of a rival, intergovernmental club, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), in 1960. However, 
already in 1961 it applied for EEC membership in recognition of the higher economic benefits associated with the 
higher level of economic integration. The UK only entered the EEC in 1973 though, having been kept out until then 
by General de Gaulle’s two famous ‘non’. R. Baldwin, C. Wyplosz: The Economics of European Integration, 5th 
edition, New York and London 2015: McGraw-Hill, trace the stances towards European integration, manifested by 
the EEC/EFTA divide, back to the different lessons that countries drew from the economic dislocation and human 
loss caused by WWII, that is, the notion of shared destiny in the EEC (the case of Germany, France, Italy and the 
Benelux countries) and the wish to preserve sovereignty (notably the case of the UK). 
17 The UK did not want to participate in the completion of economic union through the various intergovernmental 
arrangements aimed at strengthening economic governance, most notably the European Banking Union. The UK 
besides having opted out of EMU like Denmark, does not participate in the Euro-plus Pact, the Fiscal Compact 
(having obliged all the other MS to resort to an intergovernmental arrangement in the first place) and in the 
European Banking Union. See A. Sapir, G. Wolff, op. cit., for a nice graphical representation. 
	 5	
dealt with within the existing EU governance architecture.18 On the other hand, from the point of 
view of the EU club, the UK’s non-participation in many European common goods means that 
benefits from UK membership are also more limited while the UK’s blocking of decisions at the 
EU level raises costs associated with its membership.  
 
The Brexit vote has already diminished the UK’s influence in the internal market, more precisely 
in the financial sector in which it takes a particular interest due to the sector’s large weight in the 
national economy and where British influence on EU regulation used to be strong in the past. 
The British commissioner who was in charge of financial services regulation (the Commissioner 
for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union) in the European 
Commission stepped down after the vote; his entire portfolio came under the responsibility of the 
Commission Vice-President for the Euro and Social Dialogue, a choice that was swiftly 
approved by the European Parliament.19 It opens up the perspective that financial regulation in 
the single market can be better geared towards the financial stability public good of the Euro 
area, thereby reinforcing the economic union in a crucial area for the monetary union. In the past 
the regulatory area under the control of the ECB has been smaller than the single market in 
financial services (which has been to the benefit of the UK). 
 
Not so likely that other countries will follow the UK on EU exit 
One may say that it was irresponsible to call a referendum on the UK’s EU membership and to 
the extent that it was called to solve internal and leadership problems within the Tory party that 
claim may well be right.20 It did have the side effect though of providing an occasion (largely 
wasted in terms of a meaningful debate) to clarify lingering issues in the relationship between 
the UK and the EU.  
 
The idea that the UK’s departure would trigger a domino effect, prompting other EU member 
states to follow suit, has been somehow widespread. However, other member states have a much 
higher participation in the EU common goods and a stronger notion of shared destiny and/or 
higher dependence on the EU. One may hence reasonably doubt whether other member states 
will be more likely to ask for an exit from the EU now than before. Some anti–EU parties will of 
course go on demanding just that, as it is part of their agendas and their raisons d’être. Yet, most 
member states’ governments and parliaments will think twice – they will reflect on the UK’s 
case and will ponder the wider benefits to be had from their EU membership. In addition, 
without the UK at least part of the anti-EU parties across Europe, such as the National Front in 
France, the Alternative for Germany and similar parties in the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, 
Italy, Poland and Hungary, could well have fewer reasons for protesting against the EU, taking 																																																								
18 The in-depth reports carried out by the UK Government’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office Review of the EU 
Balance of Competences over the years 2012-2014 (available under https://www.gov.uk/government/news/final-
reports-in-review-of-eu-balance-of-competences-published) suggest that the UK has little fundamental cause for 
grief with the status quo and indeed much to lose from leaving the EU.. 
19 Any possible new (temporary) UK commissioner, when appointed, will most probably be put in charge of a less 
important area, if any, given the uncertainties surrounding Brexit. 
20 For bystanders, it was interesting to witness but puzzling that in the UK (not on the Continent) most criticism was 
initially directed not at the government that called the referendum but at two main scapegoats: Boris Johnson (who 
was then recalled by the new prime minister to be part of the government), on the right, and Jeremy Corbyn, on the 
left, although both had little to do with calling the referendum in the first place. An exception to that view was put 
forward by M. Wolf: How Europe should respond to Brexit, Financial Times 5 July 2016. 
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into account that their fears root in the EU’s stance (attributed to UK influence) on liberalisation 
and trade. Other anti-EU / anti-EMU parties such as the likes of Podemos and Syriza, which 
already seem to have lost momentum, may have also other motivations but are part of the anti-
globalization movement and strongly oppose the more liberalisation and trade-oriented 
traditional British stance. To the extent that right and left collude against the EU (even forming 
government coalitions as in the case of Greece) they do so especially against an open and liberal 
EU. In fact, globalization has been a key factor in motivating discontentment at the national 
level, which has been directed against the EU. While it is true that the EU’s modernization 
agendas in the face of globalization (the Lisbon and Europe 2020 strategies) have so far 
produced mixed results at best (held back by weak governance, where competences for reform 
remained at the member state level and coordination is soft), it is also true that member states 
can only hope to influence and shape globalization if they work together. A sufficient 
convergence of preferences among member states is a precondition for more effective 
governance.  
 
A divorce rather than an unhappy marriage 
What seems best at this point is a civilised and amicable divorce between the UK and the EU, 
implemented as fast as possible to avoid uncertainty.21 It does not mean that the two could not be 
very good neighbours, rather the contrary. And quite possibly they may cooperate better on areas 
of common interest (without other matters, such as Eurozone integration, being perceived as 
standing in the way) after having separated; Norway and Switzerland provide good examples. 
Until now the relationship was not good and in part could also not function because of constant 
UK opposition from within. That situation lasted “perhaps for too long”, to paraphrase Sir 
Geoffrey Howe (in his famous speech in the House of Commons that ended the Thatcher era). 
 
The UK-EU relationship ended up as something of a mismatch. Not only that the two were 
already not sharing many interests and the UK was not prepared to contribute to many European 
public goods (Economic and Monetary Union, including the Fiscal Compact and the European 
Banking Union; the Schengen agreement; freedom, security and justice, police and judicial 
cooperation; the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; etc.), but the UK was also 
unwilling to participate in the European integration process after obtaining the pre-referendum 
inter-governmental agreement in February 2016. Activating the exit clause of Article 50 
however is just about withdrawal negotiations.22 It is not about negotiating a new relationship. 
 
Rebuilding the relationship after the divorce 
There are various ways in which the UK may want to negotiate its new relationship with the 
EU.23 We believe that the Norwegian model – the UK as member of the European Economic 
Area (EEA), which grants it unrestricted access to the single European market – is the one that 																																																								
21 See S. Koehler: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/06/27/uk-trigger-article-50-immediately/#Author. 
22 One can infer from some declarations of some brexiteers and even government circles or commentators that this is 
not clear. Example of details of withdrawal negotiations are: what is going to happen to British-national 
Commission staff, given that the Commission is staffed by nationals from its member states? Or what will be the 
situation of British pensioners currently living in the EU, for instance in terms of residence permits and access to 
health care? 
23 For a detailed analysis see M. Emerson (ed.): Britain’s Future in Europe – The known Plan A to remain or the 
unknown Plan B to leave, Bruxelas e Londres, 2016, CEPS e Rowman & Littlefield. 
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would better suit the interests of both the EU and the UK. The EU cooperates well with Norway, 
without political integration needs getting in the way.  
 
A Norway-style deal is however only one of the options that the UK can contemplate after 
invoking Article 50. The conditions for acceding to the EEA are fairly straightforward but 
feature a sensitive issue for the UK, namely the free movement of persons. The UK will have to 
define its preferences, which in turn will condition the options that are available to it: EEA (with 
full access to the single market); free trade agreement (with a more limited privileged access to 
the single market, and where size matters for relative bargaining power in setting conditions); or 
WTO rules (the fall-back option, providing no privileged access to the single European 
market).24. While the question of free movement of labour will certainly be an important factor 
for the UK in the negotiation, other factors like the impact on financial services (notably the 
issues of EU passporting rights and access to Euro clearing and settlements)25 or the possible 
disruption of intra-community value chains (given the possibility of tariffs to be applied under 
WTO rules) are also bound to be relevant. In general terms it is in the interest of the UK to limit 
uncertainty with regard to future arrangements with the EU. Article 50 stipulates a two-year 
timeframe for withdrawal after notification. Negotiating a new relationship with the EU (and 
third countries) can take rather long, which is especially true for complex trade agreements (even 
more given that there is no more national expertise, as it is the European Commission that 
negotiates EU trade agreements).  
 
As for the EU, it faces a credibility issue with regard to the exact terms that it grants the UK: it 
cannot simply accept whatever member states or third countries want to do in their national 
interest, at the expense of the union and of the European project. The UK’s reported wish of 
a ‘Norway-plus’ agreement, which amounts to cherry picking in the internal market, is a case in 
point. Another is the UK’s enhanced special status that EU leaders (without any backing from 
their citizens) granted Prime Minister Cameron for him to support the remain option rather than 
fighting for leave as he said he was prepared to do; the EU concessions turned out to be of no 
avail other than setting a dangerous precedent and damaging the EU’s project and credibility. 
That is why access to the single market, which is at the centre of what the EU does, needs to 
come with clear conditions and rules, safeguarding all of the four freedoms. This is valid for 
Norway and should be for the UK. Switzerland may well be about to lose its access to the single 
market in the near future.26  																																																								
24 As put by D. Gros: Britain’s Moment of Truth, Project-Syndicate, 7 July 2016, “… real-world examples show, no 
country that wants to benefit from the European project has been able to have its cake and eat it. Open borders and 
economic integration require common rules”. 
25 Thanks to privileged access UK banks benefited from the ECB’s liquidity operations during the global financial 
crisis. The regulation and oversight of central counterparties (CCPs) – presently done jointly by the ECB and the 
Bank of England – means that there is a high proportion of euro-denominated financial activities, from which the 
City of London benefits. See W. den Haan, M. Ellison, E. Ilzetzki, M. McMahon, R. Reis: Brexit: The potential for 
a financial catastrophe and long-term consequences for the UK financial sector, CFM survey, June 2016: Brexit and 
the City, VoxEU. 
26 Due to the ‘guillotine clause’, whereby the violation of only one bilateral agreement – and there are more than 120 
between the EU and Switzerland – means that all the others are discontinued. The present issue is free movement. It 
is also noteworthy that those agreements grant Switzerland access to the single market but not for financial services. 
More generally, the EU is loath to continue ‘static’ free trade agreements that do not allow for automatically 
updating legislation, unlike what happens in the EEA (EU plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein). 
	 8	
 
2. The post-Brexit EU – Where to from now? 
 
A qualitative change in the nature of EU membership 
What comes out of this announced divorce is that EU exit will become easier (without 
necessarily causing a domino effect on other member states). Countries with preferences that are 
too divergent to accommodate may consider not to be part of the core of European integration 
and to opt out, preferring instead membership of the EEA that allows them to fully participate in 
the single market, or to negotiate a free trade agreement. Denmark, also a former EFTA member 
with the UK, is a case in point with various opt-outs, most notably to the euro. What the UK case 
has clearly shown in our view is that for the Union to be sustainable and to deliver, membership 
needs to entail a constant care taking as far as individual members’ contributions to the common 
good are concerned, with rights and obligations. 
 
The nature of EU membership has changed due to Article 50 plus the precedent set by the Brexit 
vote, which have made it politically easier for a member state that is not happy in the EU to 
leave the club. Countries will now have to make a constant effort – both with respect to their 
electorates and to their partners in the Union – to stay members. It is a development, which is in 
itself quite positive. It is in the interest of both the EU and discontent member states that do not 
wish to contribute to the club’s public goods (apparently also the case of some other EU 
members). It leads us back to the idea of variable geometry or various concentric circles in 
European integration.27 
 
The challenge that the EU faces is that the club has become not only much larger over the years 
but by many accounts also a lot more heterogeneous, implying the risk that its decision-making 
and problem-solving capacity is compromised if governance is inadequate and does not evolve 
to enable institutions to function properly. On the one hand, the EU has to come to grips with 
different preferences on issues such as regulation or institutions. Substantial differences between 
states may undermine trust (on which for instance the principle of mutual recognition relies) 
among them. Still, countries could of course trade off benefits across issue areas and various 
common goods. The fact that Brexit opened the door for any discontent member state to exit the 
club ought to reduce any member state’s capacity to hold up decisions that are in the common 
interest, and to that extent can be expected to facilitate decision-making and problem solving.  
 
A more fundamental issue is posed by the fact that the EU is faced with a situation in which 
successive enlargements brought countries with divergent views on supranational governance 
and European economic integration as a political project into the same club, whereas in the 
beginning they had been confined to different clubs, notably the EEC founding six versus EFTA, 
but then widened to include former COMECON and other countries. Those issues ultimately 
																																																								
27 At present only six countries participate in all main EU institutions and reinforced cooperation sub-clubs, namely 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Portugal and Slovenia. The UK stands out as the least integrated of all member 
states, followed by the Czech Republic, Sweden, Denmark, Poland and Hungary. See N. Koenig: A Differenciated 
View of Differentiated Integration, Policy paper 140, Berlin 2015, Jacques Delors Institut. On differentiated 
integration see W. Schäuble, K. Lamers: Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik, CDU/CSU, 1 September 1994, and 
F. Torres: A Geometria Variável da União Monetária, cap. 5, In: A. Vasconcelos et al., Portugal no Centro da Europa, 
Lisbon 1995, Edições Quetzal, 129-148. 
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raise the question as to the optimum size of the club.28 The Eurozone has de facto established 
itself as the core of European integration in the EU (since the Maastricht treaty, the EU aims at 
Economic and Monetary Union). Arguably, with the need to consolidate EMU the UK’s 
preference for a stand-alone economic union became untenable given the need to make the 
monetary union work, which called for further integration and institution building in the 
economic union sphere. 
 
The Eurozone as the core EU 
The fundamental lesson from Brexit is that the EU will need to focus and deliver on EU common 
goods in order to be sustainable. With divergent preferences across member states, that may have 
to happen through variable geometry. However, too much differentiation, through opt-outs and 
reinforced cooperation, for which there are already many examples of sub-clubs, offers a way 
out but only in the short term, as it puts the cohesiveness of the EU project at risk. Enrico 
Spolaore hints at this tension: 
“if further integration is going to take place, Europeans may have to accept a multi-
speed Europe, with only a subset of countries within the EU voluntarily moving towards 
a much closer fiscal and political union, while others keeping looser ties, or even 
leaving the Eurozone and/or the EU. Rather than resisting this reality, European 
institutions should be built with much more flexibility, and should include explicit 
provisions not only for entry but also for exit”.29 	
EMU is a political project that has triggered and still requires further integration. Making 
monetary union work requires completing the economic union so that it can sustain the single 
currency and deliver on the EU’s wider objectives. The single market can therefore not be seen 
as static. It is in the legitimate interest of present and future Eurozone members – all EU 
members except the UK and Denmark, which have an opt-out, although Denmark shadows the 
Eurozone – that it be deepened with regard to Eurozone requirements, as to make the monetary 
union function well and indeed make it sustainable in light of the increased interdependencies 
between members. This requires advances on institutional modernization and structural reform in 
the face of globalization.30 The issue is obviously important for the sustainability of the 
monetary union, but goes beyond and right to the heart of the EU project. To be sustainable, the 
EU needs to complete Economic and Monetary Union and make it deliver economic and social 
results. Member states should be prepared either to contribute to those aims or to seek alternative 
ways to follow different and non-compatible preferences, be it in the EEA or in free trade 
agreements with the EU. 
																																																								
28 I.e., whether at the margin benefits are still larger or just equal to heterogeneity costs.  
29 E. Spolaore: Monnet’s chain reaction and the future of Europe VoxEU.org. See also E. Spolaore: What is 
European Integration Really About? A Political Guide for Economists, In: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(3), 
2013, 125-44, and E. Spolaore: The Political Economy of European Integration, ch 26 In: H. Badinger and V. Nitsch 
(eds), Handbook of the Economics of European Integration, London and New York, 2015, Routledge. 
30 Thus far it was one of the issues where preferences on institutions have been evolving slowly, if at all. See A. 
Bongardt, F. Torres: EMU as a Sustainable Currency Area, In: N. Costa Cabral, J. R. Gonçalves and N. C. 
Rodrigues (eds), The Euro and the Crisis: Future Perspectives for the Eurozone as a Monetary and Budgetary Union, 
2016, Springer Verlag. 
